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ABSTRACT
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June, 1999
III house allocation problems^ we look for a systematic way of assigning a 
set of indivisible objects, e.g. houses, to a group of individuals having pref­
erences over these objects. Typical real life examples are graduate housing, 
assignment of offices and ta,sks. Once an allocation is decided upon, tlie actual 
assignments of the agents are not likely to take place simultaneously. There­
fore, rules whose predictions are independent of the sequence in which the 
actual assignments are realized turn out to be very appealing. VVe model this 
property via the consistency principle and identify various classes of consistent 
rules cirid correspondences.
Keywords: Consistency, house allocation problems, assignment of i/ndivisi- 
ble objects.
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ÖZET
EV t a h s is a t  p r o b l e m l e r in d e  TUTARLILIK
Haluk i. Ergin
Matematik Bölümü Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Alexander Goncharov
Haziran, 1999
Ev tahsisat problemlerinde, bir grup bölünmez malı, bu mallar üzerinde 
tercihleri bulunan bir grup kişiye tahsis etmenin sistematik yöntemleri 
araştırılmaktadır. Lojman, ofis ve görev tahsisatı bu ıırolılemlerin tipik
örneklerini oluşturmaktadırlar. Bir tahsisata, karar verildikten sonra., birey­
lerin fiili tahsisatlarının eşzamanlı olarak gerçekleşme olasılığı düşüktür. Bu 
yüzden, fiili tahsisatın izleyeceği sıradan bağımsız olan tahsisat kuralları cazip 
bir sınıf oluşturma.kta.dırlar. Bu tezde, yukarıda, sözü geçen özellik tutarhlık 
firensibi ile modellenrnekte ve çeşitli tek ve çok değerli tutarh kural sınıfları be­
lirlenmektedir.
Anahtar kelimeler: Tutarlılık, ev tahsisat problemleri, bölünmez mal tah­
sisatı.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A house allocation problem is a one-sided matching problem, where a set of 
agents collectively own a set of indivisible goods, e.g. houses, and every agent 
has strict preferences over these indivisible goods. The number of agents and 
the number of houses are assumed to be finite and equal. An allocation is an 
assignment of the houses to the agents, such that each agent receives exactly 
one house. Assignment of dormitory rooms or offices at the beginning of the 
academic year are exa.mples of house allocation problems.
House allocation problems are closely related to the housing market model 
introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). The only difference between the 
two classes is that, in the latter, each agent owns one house, whereas in 
the former, houses are owned collectively. The housing market model has 
been thoroughly investigated and many strong results have been obtained 
c;oncerning the core (competitive) correspondence. Roth and Postlewaite 
(1977) show that the core correspondence is singlevalued and K.oth (1982) 
shows that it is strategy-prooj. Ma (1994) shows that the core corri^spondence 
is the only correspondence that is Pareto optimal, individually rational and
1
strategy-proof. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1998a) introduce the core from 
random endowments as a lottery mechanism for house allocation problems. 
They show that the core from random endowments is equivalent to random 
serial dictatorship, which formally establishes the close relationship between 
the housing market model and the house allocation problems.
In the context of house allocation problems, a correspondence is a map 
that chooses a set of allocations for each problem. A rule is a singlevalued 
correspondence. In this thesis, we identify various classes of consistent and 
convej'sely consistent correspondences. Informally, consistency requires that, 
if an allocation is chosen for a problem, then for any subgroup of agents, 
the restriction of that allocation should be chosen for the smaller problem 
consisting of that subgroup and their original assignments. Consistent rules 
are coherent in their suggestions for problems involving different groups of 
agents. For example, in ? -^persori bargaining problems, a rule that selects 
the egalitarian outcome when n equals 2 and a dictatorial outcome when n 
is greater than 2, is quite implausible because it is not consistent. The con­
sistency principle has been analyzed in many contexts, such as game theory, 
public finance, and fair allocation.^ As we illustrate in the next |)aragraph, 
consistent rules also have a very practical appeal in classes of resource alloca­
tion problems where individuals are likely to receive their material allocations 
sequentially. Examples of such classes are two-sided matching, rationing and 
house allocation problems where many strong results have already been ob­
tained from the applications of the consistency principle. In economies with 
indivisible goods and money, Tadenuma and Thomson (1991) identify the
comprehensive survey of consistency for resource allocation problems can be inund 
in Tliomson (1996).
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correspondences that satisfy no-envy and variants of consistency^ neutrality, 
a.nd converse consistency. In a large class of two-sided matching problems, 
Sasaki and Toda (1992) show that the stable correspondence (the core) is the 
only correspondence that satisfies Pareto optimality, anonymity, consistency, 
and converse consistency. Moulin (1997) investigates consistent rules in the 
context of rationing problems.
In the context of house allocation problems, consistency re(]uires that 
once an allocation is chosen and a group of agents take their assigned houses 
before the others, the allocation rule should not change the assignments of 
the remaining agents in the reduced problem involving the remaining agents 
and houses. For example, suppose that a rule assigning dormitory rooms 
to students is not consistent. Then, if some students occupy tlieir rooms 
before the others, the rule may require a change in the assignments of the 
remaining students! Such a change would not only impose operational and 
tra.nsactional costs, but it would also lead the agents and the authorities 
to question the plausibility of the rule. Consistent rules are robust to non- 
sirnultaneous allocations of the houses. Therefore, we believe that consistent 
rules are more likely to emerge than ‘inconsistent’ rules.
In a problem where every agent has the same i^references over the housois, 
every allocation discriminates between agents. Indeed, there is a. one-to-one 
correspondence between allocations and priority orderings over the set of in­
dividuals, illustrating the impossibility of equal treatment of equeds in this 
class of problems. For this reason, “sequential solutions” and “serial dictator­
ships” constitute a powerfid class of rules when randomization or monetary 
compensations a.re not allowed. Given an exogenous priority orden'ing which
rna.y for example be based on seniority, a serial dictatorship rule sequenticdly 
assigns every agent his most preferred house while respecting earlier assign­
ments. Sequential solutions are a more general class of rules where certain 
agents receive their least preferred house when their turn com(;s. Simple 
sequential solutions are consistent^ conversely consistent, and neutral. In 
Theorem 1, we show that simple sequential solutions are the only rules that 
satisfy a weak form of consistency and a weak form of neutrality, namely 
pairwise consistency and pairwise neutrality. Simple serial dictatorships are 
Pareto optimal, strategy-proof, consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral. 
In Corollary 1, we show that simple serial dictatorships are the only rules 
tha.t are weakly Pareto optimal, pairivise consistent, and pairwise neutral. 
Besides its descriptive nature, Theorem 1 can be interpreted as a negative 
finding, since dropping efficiency does not allow us to recover rules having 
other properties of normative interest. Then, we drop singlevaluedness. In 
Proposition 5, we show that anonymous correspondences are not very ap­
pealing even in the multivalued case. In Corollary 2, we characterize Pareto 
optimal, consistent, and conversely consistent correspondences via their be­
havior in two-person problems. In Theorem 2, we show that a correspondence 
is non-empty valued, Pareto optimal, consistent, conversely consistent, and 
neutral if and ordy if it can be written as a union of serial dictatorships in 
a particular manner.
In Chapter 4, we relax some of our axioms with the hope of overcom­
ing the dictatorial feature of consistent correspondences mentioned above. 
Firstly, we weaken the pairwise neutrality axiom and introduce lower neu­
trality which requires a rule to be independent of the agents’ bottom-i'anked
houses in two-person problems. S^Serial bidictatorships” constitute a class 
which generalizes serial dictatorships. Given an exogenous priority order­
ing with possibly ties oF size two and tie-breaking functions indexed by the 
houses, a serial bidictatorship rule assigns agents tlieir most preferred houses 
while respecting earlier assignments and breaking ties in the priority ordering 
by using the tie-breaking functions. If two agents are in the same indifference 
class w.r.t. the priority ordering, the tie-breaking process may be interpreted 
as partitioning the set of houses into two, so that each of the two agents has 
priority over the possession of the houses in one of these subsets. For ex­
ample, when allocating offices, it is reasonable to give priority to a professor 
doing computational research, over the offices equipped with advanced com­
puters and to give prioritj^ to a professor who is mainly involved in teaching, 
over large sized offices, so that he can conduct his office-hours cornfoi'tably. 
Simple serial bidictatorships need not be dictatorial. They are Pareto op­
timal^ strategij-proof] consistent^ conversely consistent and lower neutral In 
Theorem 3, we show that simple serial bidictatorships are the only rules that 
are weakly Pareto optirnal  ^ pairwise consistent and lower neutral
Then, we allow rules to associate with each problem, a lottery over the 
allocations for that problem. We extend the consistency principle to lottery­
valued rules by requiring that a priori, a decision to draw the lottery in 
arbitrary sequence should not change the lotteries faced in the beginning. 
However, the answer to the question of existence of anonymous and consis­
tent lottery-valued rules turns out to be negative, as we show in Theorem 4 
that there does not exist an ex-post Pareto optimal^ consistent and ex-ante 
anonymous lottery-valued rule. Precise definitions of the above concepts are
provided in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 contain the results and Chapter 5 
|)resents the concluding remarks. The independence of axioms is deferred to 
the appendix.
Chapter 2
Environm ents
Let J\f be a set o f poten tial agents and 7i a set o f potential houses
such that \M\ > 3 and \H\ > 3. A house allocation problem or simpl}  ^ a. 
problem  is a triplet S = (N^ ff(R i)i^N )  where ^  N C. Ai^ 0 7^  / /  C 7Y, 
\N\ = \H\ is finite, and for each i G Ri is a linear order on H  representing 
agent z’s preference over the houses in R }  For each i G N  ^ Pi denotes the 
asymmetric part of Ri'^
Given a problem S — (A/",//, (/A)ieN)? allocation [i : N H is a 
bijection, where /i(z) denotes the house assigned to agent i.
Let S = (N^ H^{Ri)i£N) any problem, ¡1 any allocation for E and 
G N  any two agents. We say that i envies j  under fi if /i(y) Pi /¿(¿). 
An allocation correspondence, or simply a correspondence^ is a map
binary relation Ri on II is a l inear order  if it is reflexive  (Va G H : ciRia)  ^
complete  (Va, 6 E II : ci f  b = >  aRib or 67?-ja), t ransi t ive  (Va,6,r; G // : aliib and 
bRiC = >  aRic) and a n t i s y m m e t r i c  {Ma,b G H : aRib and bllia = >  a — b). Indiilerence 
between different houses is not allowed.
‘^ For any a^b E I'P we say aPib if and only if aRib and not bRi,a. In general, a relation 
Ri on II is a s y m m e t r i c  if for any a, 6 G / / ,  aPib implies not bPi,a.
(/? which associates with each problem a possibly empty set of allocations 
Cor that problem. An allocation rule, or simply a rule, is a ma,]) cp which 
associates with each problem exactly one allocation for that problem. A rule 
is a singlevalued correspondence.
Given a problem £ = {N, an allocation / /  for £ weakly
P areto  dom inates another allocation ц for £ if every agent in N is weakly 
better off and at least one agent is strictly better off under y' tha.n under /i. 
The allocation y' strongly Pareto dom inates ц lor £ if every agent in N  
is strictly better off under ц' than under /i. The P areto correspondence 
associates with each problem the set of allocations that are not weakly Pareto 
dominated. The weak Pareto correspondence associates with each prob­
lem the set of allocations that are not strongly Pareto dominated. A corre­
spondence is P areto optim al if it never chooses alloca.tions that are weakly 
Pareto dominated. Similarly, a correspondence is weakly P areto optim al 
if it never chooses allocations that are strongly Pareto dominated.
Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998a) show that serial dictatorships lead 
to Pareto optimal allocations. Serial dictatorships can be considered as the 
Pareto optimal subclass of a more general class of rules that we call sequential 
solutions. Given a problem £ - (/V, У:/, (7i;),g/v), a linear order h  on N and 
a. sub.set M C N, the sequential allocation induced by У and M  fo r  
£ is defined inductively as follows. Let be the person from tlie to[) 
in N w.r.t. Ş:. First, if P Ğ M, then г* is a,llocafed his top-ranked house in 
i f , otherwise P is allocated his bottom-ranked house in H. At the R''' step, 
if if € M, then г^ ' is allocated his top-ranked house among those that are 
not a.lready a.llocated in earlier steps, otherwise is allocated his bottom-
ranked house among the remaining ones. The set M  identifies the set of 
agents whose welfares are maximized by the sequential solution. Let be 
the bottom-ranked person in N  w.r.t. Note that the sequential allocation 
induced by ^  and M  will be the same, whether i'"' G M  or not. Moreover, if 
M D N  \  then the above sequential solution corresponds with the serial 
dictatorship induced by Formally, given a. problem S = (N, 
and a. linear order ^  on N, the serial d ictatorship  allocation induced by 
y  fo r  £ is the sequential allocation induced by ^  and N  for £. (Conversely, 
a. sequential allocation coincides with the serial dictatorship allocation where 
the preferences of the agents in N \  M  a.re turned upside-down.
VVe next introduce natural extensions of sequential solutions to the vari­
able population case. For any linear order ^  on M  and any 0 fV C A/", let 
^  |yv be the restriction of to N. A rule is a sim ple sequential so lu tion  
if there exists a linear order ^  on M  and a subset M  C Af such that for 
any problem £ — {N,J-f{Ri)i^N), the rule selects the sequential allocation 
induced by ^  |;v and A i fl N. In this case, the rule, is denoted by 
A rule is a sim ple seria l d ictatorship  if it coincides with for some
linear order ^  on Af. For simplicity, we will denote such a rule by ¡p-.
For any problem £ — {N., I f  any % f  N' <Z N  and any allocation
/i for £, the reduced problem  o f  £ w .r.t. N' at /i is:
r ii,(£ )=  (« '.M W '), (ftl,
wliere is the set of remaining houses after the agents in N \  have
■fSince agents have strict preferencces, given a linear order a subset M C M and a 
l)robleiiT there exists a unique sequential allocation induced by y  |at and M  D N for S. 
Therefore, ip-'^  is well defined as a rule.
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left with their assigned houses, arid is the restriction of agent i ’s
|)reference to the remaining houses. The reduced allocation w .r.t. N', 
is the bijection defined by /iyv'(i) = each i G N'.
A correspondence (p is consisten t if for any problem S = (N, II, (7A:);eAf), 
any ih ^  N ’ C  N  and any p G <p{S), one has /.¿a/' G (p{r%,(8)). Note tliat 
tlie union of consistent correspondences is consistent. A correspondence (p is 
pairw ise consisten t if for any problem £ = (N, H, any N' C  N
witli lA^ 'l = 2 and any //, G p(8), one has pN' G (/?(r^/(5)). It is con­
versely  consisten t if for any problem S = (N, with |A^ | > 2
a.nd any allocation p for £ such that for any N' C N  with |A^ '| = 2 we 
have /iyv' G </?(r ,^(£ )^), we have p G ^{£)-‘^ By changing set memberships 
to equalities, one obtains the definitions of consistency, pairwise consistency 
and converse consistency for rules.
Anonymity requires that a correspondence should be independent of the 
names of the agents. Formally, a correspondence ip is anonym ous  if for any 
0 ^  H C H, any two problems £ - (N, H,{Ri)i^i^), £' = (N ', H,{R[)ieN>)
"’An alternative deiinition of converse consistency would require that if for any proper 
subset N'  of N  with |A^ '| > 2, one has //Af/ G ^ V^ (^ )· These two
deiinitions turn out to he ecpiivalent in the context of house allocation problems. It is 
straightforward to check the equivalence of these definitions via induction on tlie number of 
])layers, by using the following two t rarisi tivi ty  properties of reduction: if 0 A"" C N' C
N, E — (N, H,{Ri)i^M)  ks a problem and /./. is an allocation for E then (r^/ (^)) =
(E) and — RN"· By using the same properties, one can also show that
pairwise consistency and converse consistency imply consistency. The latter statement 
is a direct consequence of Lemma 2. Thomson (1996) points out that in any class of 
allocation problems where admissible problems involve finitely many agents and reduction 
is transitive^ the two forms of converse consistency are equivalent.
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and any ¡1 € if tv : N ^  N' \s a. bijection satisfying:
V ie  N ,\/a ,b e  H : aRib ^  aR'^ ^^ b^,
then /,i o 7r~' e
Neutrality requires that a correspondence should be independent of the 
particular labeling of the houses. More precisely, a correspondence is 
neutral if for any $ ^  N C JV, any two problems E = (A^,//,
£' = (N,H',{R'i)i^N) and any ¡x e y i^E)  ^ ifTr: II H' is a bijection satisfy­
ing:
Vi e N, Va,b e H : aRib TT{a)R'-Tv{b),
then TT o n e ^p{E'). By clianging the quantifier “for any 0 ^  At C A/"” to “tor 
any N C JV with |At| = 2”, we obtain the definition of pairw ise neutrality.
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Chapter 3
M ain R esults
3.1 C on sisten t R ules
For any i G any linear order ^  on J\f and any 0 ^  c  let L{i^y  
,N ) = {j G N\i y  j} . A property that characterizes serial dictatorships in 
the context of assignment problems is that an agent never envies those who 
are ranked below him in the serial dictatorship order. This idea is generalized 
to sequential solutions in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let £ = (A ,^//, M <Z N and let y  he a, linear order on
N. /In allocation /i for £ is the sequential allocation induced by y  and
M  fo r  £ if and only if the following are true:
J. jifi) Ri ii{j) for any i £ N f\ M and any j  G L(i, fo, N),
2. n ij) Ri fi{i) for any i £ N \  M and any j  G L{i, y ,N ) .
Proof Let £ = (N, LR {Ri)i^¡\¡), M £  N  a.nd let ^ be a linear order on N.
First, assume that // is the sequential allocation induced by ^  and M for 
£. Let i £ N  and j  £ L ( i ,y ,N ) .  Since i y  j ,  j  does not come before i
in the sequential solution order. Therefore, ¡j,[j) is not previously allocated 
at the step when i receives his house. If i M , then is the top-ranked 
house among the remaining ones w.r.t. Ri, at the step when ¿’s assignment 
is made. In particular, n(i) Ri /^(j). Similarly, if i ^ M, then /i(i) is the 
l)ottorn-ranked house among the remaining ones w.r.t. Ri, at the ste[) when 
i ’s a.ssignment is made. In particular, /r(j) Ri n(i).
For the converse, assume that the allocation fi for S is such that Con­
ditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. For each k G {1,.··, \N\}, let i/' G N  be 
the person from the top in N  w.r.t. Let k G {I , . . . ,  |A^ |} a.nd
a G · · ·) /-<(*'^ '0}· '^ bhen a = for some j  G L{i^ N).
Therefore, if G M, we have Rik a by Condition 1, and is the top- 
ranked house in · -5 w.r.t. Rik. Similarly, if ^ M ,
by Condition 2, we have that a Rik and is the bottom-ra.nked
house in {^(¿^), . . . ,  //(¿1^1)} w.r.t. Rik. So, initially, if i' G M, then
receives his top-rardied house in //. Otherwise, he receives his bottom- 
raidced house in H . At the k}  ^ step, if G M , then receives his top-rard<ed 
house among those that are not already allocated in earlier steps, otherwise
I rc;ci eives his bottom-ranked house among the remaining ones. 'Fherefore,
//, is the sequential allocation induced by ^  and M  for E.
QED
Proposition 1 Simple .‘sequential solutions are consistent, conversely con­
sistent, and neutral.
Proof: Let fo be a linear order on Af and let M  C Ai.
To see that is consistent, let £ = {N,H, (/¿¿)igyv), fJ> = P’- ’''^i£) and
^  N 'd  N. Let M = AA f] N  and M' = AA C\ N'. Since p is the sequential
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a.llocation induced by ^  |/v and M  tor £, by Lemma 1, we have:
1. Ri /i(j) for any i £ N  C\ M  and any j  € L{i, y  \n ,N ),
2. /i(j) Ri fi(i) tor any i ^ N  \  M and any j  G L(i, h; |n ) ^ ) ·
Since for any i G N, it, is true that L ( i ,y  |/v',A^0 C L ( i ,y  we in
|)articula.r have:
1. /.i;v'(0 Ri\n{N') fJ’N'ij) for any i e N' n M' and any j  G L{i, y  1^ /^, A '^),
2· fiN'ij) IJ'N'ii) for any i e N' \  M ' and any j  G L{i, y  |/v/, A^ ').
By Lemma 1 and Conditions 1 and 2 above, we have that /r;v' is the sequential 
allocation induced by ^  |Af' and M' = A4 D N' for r^,(£). Therefore, /,i/v' = 
(rJ^,(T)), showing that is consistent.
To see that ip-’·^  is conversehy consistent., let £  =  [N, H,{Ri)i^i^)  be any 
problem with |A^ | > 2 and let ¡i be an allocation for £ such that for any 
i/) ^  N ' C  N  with |At'| = 2, we have /i/v' € >(£)). Let i G N, j  G
L{i, y ,  N), M  = MC\N  and M' = MC]{i, j} . Since = p - ’“^  (^7’i'. 
the allocation P{i,j] is the sequential allocation induced by ^  and M' 
(or ;}(^)· Loimoa 1, we have:
( ■ t^ {h.i}{ )^ i^{i,.i}(j) ’f i ^ M ,
2· tHhiiU) ^i\i4ici}) if* i
Equivalently,
1. nii) Ri ii(j) for any i e N f] M  and any j  G L{i, y  |/v, A^ ),
2. /i(j) Ri n(i) for any i ^  N \  M  a.nd any j  G L{i, y  |;v, N).
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So, by Lemma 1, ¡x is the sequential allocation induced by ^  |/v and M — 
Ai r\ N  for £,  i.e. pL =  Therefore, is conversely consistent.
To see that is neutral, let ih ^ N C Af, £ =  (A^,/ / ,  (7L)ig/v),
(N,H', (R[)i^N) and let tt: H ^  H' be a bijection satisfying:d  _L·’ —
Ml G N, Va, b e  H ■. aRib 7T{a)R!pK{b).
Let M — M O.N, y = (f-'-'^{£), y' = (f-'-^{£') and for each k G {1, . . . ,  \N\}, 
let iA G N  be the kA’ irerson from the top in N w.r.t. Suppose that 
7r(/i(i*)) 7^  l^'il^)· H G M, then y'{i^) is the top-ranked house in H' 
w.r.t. R[i and one has /T(i‘) F[i 7r(/i(i*)). By assumption, H 9 7r“ '(/i'(i*)) 
Pı^  7r“ *(7r(/:<(i )^)) = y{i^)i a contradiction to y{i^) being the top-ranked 
house in H  w.r.t. /?;i. Otherwise, il ^ M, then y'{P) is the bottom- 
ranked house in I f  w.r.t. R'-x and one has 7r(/r(?d)) Tt' Then, /i(T) =
7r~'(7r(/r('i*))) Py 7r“ '(/-i'(?d)) G H , a contradiction to y(i^) being the bottom- 
ranked house in H w.r.t. Ry. Therefore, 7r(/r(z')) = Now, assume that
there exists k G {2, . . . ,  |A^|), such that for all I G {! , . . . ,  k — 1} one has 
ir{/i(i‘)) — /i'(-i'). Suppose that 'K{ii{i^)) ^  y'{i^). If if^ ' G M, then ii'(iA) i 
the top-ranked house in ) , . . . ,  / '^(¿1^1)) 9 'K{ji{iA)) w.r.t. R!-u
and one has P[k But then {y ii’'), . . . ,  //('¿1' '^)} 9
TT~' (n'{iA)) Py 7r~*(7r(/i(i^’))) = fi' contradiction to being the top-
ra.rd<ed house in {y(i^), . . . ,  w.r.t. R^k. Otherwise, if ^ M,
then //('¿ '^) is the bottom-ranked house in {n'(iA), /r'(z^+*),. . ., //(d^l)} 9 
TrijiiiA)) w.r.t. R!-k and one has 7r(/Li(i^ )) y'{i^). So, - tt“ '(7r(/i(i'“)))
Pik 7T~V//(i^·)) G /<(*^ '''*)^  · · · > a contradiction to ii{iA) being
tlie bottom-ranked house in {yii^), /r(?i^+‘) , . . . ,  w.r.t. Itik. There­
fore, 7r(/i(i^)) = By induction, Tr(/j,(i)) — y'(i) for any i E N, showing
IS
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that, is neutral.
QED
P roposition  2 Simple serial dictatorships are Pareto optimal, consistent, 
conversely consistent, and neutral.
P ro o f By Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998a), serial dictatorships lead to 
Pareto optimal allocations. Therefore, simple serial dictatorships are Pareto 
optimal. The other claims directly follow from Proposition 1.
QED
T heorem  1 If a rule is pairwise consistent and pairwise neutral, then it is 
a simple sequential solution.
P ro o f Let (f be any pairwise consistent and pairwise neutral rule. Let a, b G 
7Ï be two distinct houses and i , j  £ N  two distinct agents. Let the problems 
S' and S'^  be as follows:
S' S'^
P' p2 Pf.7 1 .7
a a a b
b b b a
Depending on the values that ip ta,kes (the underlined selections below) in 
the problems S' and S'^, exactly one ot the following four cases |)revails:
• Case 1: i y  j
PI P.I Pf Pf
a a a b
b b b a
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• Case 2: i ' ^ j
Case S: j  ^  i
• Case 4·' j  ^  i
Pi p i p .2] ‘ P f
a a a b
b b b Ql
PI PI P f P f
a a Ql b
b b b a
PI p j P f ¡R]
Ql a a b
b b h Ql
By the pairwise neutrality assumption, the four cases above aie indepen­
dent of the choice of houses a and b. Tlierefore, we have:
• Case 1: i fo j  in any problem £ involving i and j , i does not envy j under
^ { S ) .
Indeed, suppose that tliere exists a problem £ = (A^ , //, {Ri)i^N) involving 
i and j ,  such that i envies j  under ¡i = g>{£)· Then, p,{j) ¡4 p.(i), i·«· 
/i{i^j]{j) Ri\i4{i,j}) lHi,j}{>')· 111 conjunction with the parnoi.se consistency oi ip, 
this implies that one of the following cases prevails in the reduced problem
{£)■.
Pj Pг\ı4{h:i}) p".i Ldiui})
IH o iJ) IH oO )
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wiiore the underlined allocations represent t^’s selection for the reduced prob­
lem. In either case, we obtain a contradiction to i y  j  by setting a ~  
and h -
• Case 2: i C j  In any problem S involving i and j , i envies j  under <p>{S).
Suppose that there exists a problem £ = [N ^ H ^ {Ri)i^N) involving i a.nd 
j ,  such that i does not envy j  under p = ip(£). Then, /.¿(i) I) p ij), i.e. 
//-{¿,i}(0 Ri\r{[i,:i}) /^ {¿..7}(.;’)· By pairwise consistency of (f, one of the following 
cases prevails in the reduced problem
lc.({h.d)
/*{C.7)(0
iH o i i) H o i . j )
where the underlined allocations represent selection for the reduced [)rob- 
lem. In either case, we obtain a contradiction to iC  j  by setting a = 
and 1) =  7W{i,i}(i)·
The two other cases are exactly symmetric. Since the four cases consid- 
('.red are independent of the choice of houses a and 6, we can defiiKi a rejiexive 
r(;lation fo on Jtf by hitting i y  j  if and only if i ^  j  or i y  j ,  lor any two 
distinct i , j  G M .  The relation fo is complete since one ot tin; four cases 
prevails and it is antisymmetric since the four cases are mutually exclusive. 
We will now show that for any three distinct agents i, j, k G Af, the iollowing 
implications hold:
> i y  k,
 ^ i y  k,
‘ i y  k,
- i y  k.
•i y  j  and j  fo k 
•i y  j and j  y  k
• i  ^  j  j  ^
• i fo j  j  y  k
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Let, a,b,c ^  7i he three distinct houses and let i , j ,k  6 Af be any three 
distinct agents.
i y  j  and j  y  k i y  k:
Suppose that i y  j  and j  y  k. Then, in any problem involving i, j  and A:, 
we have that i does not (mvy j  and j  does not envy k. Consider the following 
problem S and the underlined allocation fi:
p . P , Pk
a a a
b b b
c c c
Note that n is the unicpie allocation for E under which i does not envy j  
and j  does not envy k. Therefore, /i = <f{E). (Jonsider the reduced problem
p . P k
Ql a
c c
By pairwise consistency of </?, the underlined selection p,{i,k} G if ·
Therefore, either i y  k or ^  i.
Consider the following i)roblem £ and the underlined allocation p:
p . P:i P k
a a c
b b b
c c a
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Note that ¡i is the unique allocation lor £ under which i does not envy j  
and j  does not envy k. Therefore, /i = ^{£). Consider the reduced problem
Pr Pk
a c
c a
By painmse consistency of the underlined selection P{i,k) € (f ·
Therefore, either i k or k ^  i. By the above pa.ra.graph, i ^  k.
i y  j  and j  ^  k i >- k:
Suppose that i >z j  and j_ y  k. Then, in any problem involving i, j  and 
k, we have that i does not envy j  and j  envies k. Consider the following- 
problem S and the underlined allocation ¡i:
P. p, Pk
a c C
b h h
c a a
Note that /i is the unique allocation for S under which i does not envy j  
and j  envies k. Therefore, ¡i — (/?(£). By considering the reduccxl |)roblem 
(¿7) a.nd by pairwise, consistency o( (f, eil.her i y  k or k y  i.
Consider the fc
p. Pk
a C a
b b b
c a c
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Hero, n is the unique allocation for £ under which i does not envy j  and j  
envies k. Therefore, /i =  ^^{£)· By considering the reduced probhun 
a,nd by pairwise consistency of (/?, either i y  k or k y  i. By the al)ove 
paragraph, i fo k.
i y  j  and j  y  k i y  k:
Suppose that i y  j  and j  y  k. Then, in any problem involving z, j  and 
k, we have that i envies j  and j  does not env}^  k. Consider the: following 
|)i’oblern £ and the underlined allocation y:
Pi P, Pk
a c c
b h b
c a a
It can be seen that /,« is the unique allocation for £ under which i envies j  
and j  does not envy k. d'herefore, // = ip{£). By considering the reduced 
problem i^j{£) and by pavnuise consistency of </?, either i^y k or ^  i. 
Consider the following problem £ and the underlined allocation p:
Pi Pr Pk
a c a
b b b
c a c
Hei-e, ¡1 is the unique allocation for £ under which i envies j  and j  does not 
omvy k. Therefore, /i = <p{£). By considering the reduced problem 
and by pairwise consistency of ip, either i y  k or k ^  i. By the above 
|)aragra.ph, i y k .
i  ^  j  j  y  k = >  i y  k:
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Suppose that, i ^ j  and j  ^  k. Then, in any problem involving j  a.nd 
k, we have that i envies j  and j  envies k. Consider the following problem S 
and the underlined allocation ¡r.
p. P:i Pk
a a a
b h h
c c c
Note that fj, is the unique allocation for £ under which i envies j  and j  envies 
k. Therefore, (i = </?(£’)· By considering the reduced problem and
by pairwist consistency of (/?, either i fo A; or k y  i.
Consider the following problem £ and the underlined allocation /i:
P^ P, Pk
a a c
h b b
c c a
In this case, p is the unique allocation for £ under which i envies j and j  
(Mivies k. Therefore, p = ^{£)· By considering the reduced problem 
and by pairwise consistency of (/?, either i fo k or ^  ^  i. By the above 
])ai'agraph, i fo k.
The four implications shown above imply that tor any three distinct
i , j , k  e
fo j  and j  y  k i y  k^ and (i fo j  and j  h  k i h  k) 
In particular, the relation fo is transitive.
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Let i G M  not be the minimal element^ oi J\f w.r.t. Then, there exists 
L· 6 L (i,y ,A f)  with i >- k?  Let j  G L (i,y ,A i)  such that j  ^  k and i >- j ,  
then:
• i ^  k i ^  j : Sup])ose that i ^  k. if k ^  j, we immediately have that 
>■ ^ j- Otherwise if j  ^ A:, suppose that it is not true that i ^ j. But then 
since i y  j ,  we must ha.ve i  ^  j. Along with j  ^  k, this implies that i y  k, 
a contradiction. Therefore, i y  j.
• i y  k i  t: j ■' Suppose that i y  k. Similarly, if k y  j ,  we immediately
have that i y  j . Otherwise if j  ^  k, suppose that it is not true that i ^  j . 
But then since i y  j ,  we must have i y  j. Along with j  y  k, this implies 
that i y  k, a contradiction. Therefore, i y  j.
Therefore, we may validly define the set J\4 C A/” as follows. II there 
exists a minimal element oi Af w.r.t. let it belong to M . For any other 
i G A/*, let i G Ad if and only if i y  k for some—or for any k G L (i,y ,J \i)  
with i y  k.
Finally, let £ = (N, i e N, j  ^  L { i ,y ,N )  and // = ip(£). If
i = j  then - li(j) and therefore /r(i) Ri ¡J,{j) and ¡x{j) Ri Otherwise
i ^  J, so we liave i y  j . In this case, if i ^ N D Ad then by construction 
^  .A Le. i never envies j , i.e. n(i) Ri /r(j). Otherwise il i ^ N \ j \4  then by 
construction i  y  J, i.e. i always envies j ,  i.e. ii{j) Ri ¡i{i). By Lemma 1, ¡.i 
is the sequential allocation induced by A jyy and A4 f] N  for £. Therefore, y?
'For any i G A/", i is the m i n i m a l  e l ement  of Af w.r.t. if for any j  G Af, we have
j  y  i. For the case when Af is finite, this is equivalent to saying that i is the bottom-
ranked agent in Af w.r.t. By the antisymrneli'y of there exists at most one minimal
element of Af w.r.t. y .
“y  is used to denote the asymmetric part of
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is the simple sequential solution induced by ^  and A4.
QED
C orollary  1 If a rule is weakly Pareto optimal, pairxoise consistent, and 
pairwise neutral, then it is a simple serial dictatorship.
P ro o f Let if be a xueakly Pareto optimal, pairwise consistent, and pairwise 
'neutral rule. By Theorem 1, (/? is a simple sequential solution, i.e. there exists 
^  a.nd M  C Ai such that (p = . Suppose that p ^  . Then there
('xists i ^  M  \  A i such tliat i is not the minimal element in Af w.r.t. Let 
j  G Af be such that i >- j  and let the problem S be as follows:
P. C
a h
b a
Since i ^  A4, under the allocation pi£) = p-^^(£ ), agents i and j  receive b 
and a, respectively. However, both are made strictly better off by excliang- 
ing their assigned houses, a contradiction to p  being weakly Pareto optimal. 
Therefore, p — p -.
CiED
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3.2 C on sisten t C orrespondences
Tliornson (1998) points out that the Pareto correspondence is consislent in 
allocation problems where goods are privatel}'· appropriable. VVe start by 
proving this remark in our special context of house allocation pi'oi)lems.
P ro p o sitio n  3 The Pareto correspondence is consistent.
P ro o f Let (p be the Pa.reto correspondence. Also, let £ = (N,
//, G <p(£) a.nd 0 /  Al' C Af. Suppose that h n ' ^ p  { £) ) .  ddien, there 
is an allocation JI for 7'y(^ , {£) that weakly Pareto dominates /.ink Define the 
a.lloca.tion ¡.d for £ by:
l.L{i) = <
¡i{i) if i G A/', 
p,{i) otherwise.
'rhen, p' weakly Pareto dominates p for i ”, a contradiction to p Ireing a 
Pareto optimal <i\\oci\.i\on. Therefore, p^i G p {£))., showing that p  is 
consistent.
QDI)
The following proj)osition asserts tliat the Pareto correspondence is not 
conversely consistent, ft is analogous to Tadenuma and Thomson’s (1991) 
result about the lack of converse consistency of the Pai'eto correspondence 
in economies with indivisible goods and money.
P roposition  4 The Pareto correspondence is not conversely consistent. The 
weak Pareto corre.spondence is neither pairwise consi.stent nor conversely con­
sistent.
25
Proof Let 1, 2, 3 be three distinct potential agents and a, b, c three distinct 
potential houses. To see that the Pareto correspondence is not conversely 
consistent, consider the following problem £:
Pi Pz Ps
a c b
b a c
c b a
Let fj, be the allocation corresponding to the underlined selection. Note 
that for any { i , j}  C {1,2,3} with i ^  j ,  the allocation is chosen by
the Pareto correspondence in the reduced problem Thus, il the
Pareto correspondence were conversely consistent, then fj, should be in the 
set of Pareto optimal allocations for £. However, /x is strongly and therefore 
weakly Pareto dominated in £, so it is not in the Pareto correspondence for 
£, showing that the Pareto correspondence is not conversely consistent. The 
same example shows that the weak Pareto correspondence is not conversely 
consistent.
To see that the weak Pareto correspondence is not pairwise consistent, 
consider the following problem £:
Pi Pz P-3
a c b
b b c
c a a
Let /X be the allocation corresponding to the underlined selection. The 
allocation p is not strongly Pareto dominated in £, therefore it is in the 
weak Pareto correspondence for £. However, the reduced allocation /X{2,3}
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strongly Pareto dominated in the reduced problem r'^ ,^  gj (£’) , thus /¿{2,3} is 
not in the weak Pareto correspondence for (^)> showing that the weak 
Pareto correspondence is not pairwise consistent.
QED
The Pareto correspondence is anonymous but not conversely consistent. 
The next proposition shows that there does not exist a non-empty valued 
correspondence that is weakly Pareto optimal, anonymous, and conversely 
consistent.
P roposition  5 Any non-empty valued, anonymous, and conversely consis­
tent corre.spondence is not weakly Pareto optimal.
P ro o f Let (f be a non-empty valued, anonymous, and conversely consistent 
correspondence. Then, for any distinct i , j  e Af and a,b eP i,  the correspon­
dence if will choose both allocations from the problem:
Pi
a a
b b
since it is non-empty valued and anonymous. By converse consistency of (p, 
the underlined allocation will be chosen by p  from the following problem
Pi P2 P3
a c h
h a c
c b a
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Note that the allocation // is strongly Pareto dominated in showing that 
V? is not weakly Pareto optimal.
QED
For any correspondence or rule (p, let <p\2 be its restriction to two-person 
l)roblerris. A correspondence (p is an extension  of a correspondence Ip de­
li ned for two-person problems if (pj'j =  The following lemma states that 
consistent and conversely consistent correspondences are characterized by 
their restrictions to two-person problems.
L em m a 2 For any correspondence Ip defined for two-person problems, there 
exists a consistent and conversely consistent extension p that is unique up 
to one-person problems.'^ The extension p is defined as follows. For any 
problem £ =  (N, FI,(Ri)i^i\i) with |A/^ | > 2 and for any allocation ¡t for S:
p  €  p ( £ ) \/N' C N xoith |A '| = 2 : G p{r^^,{£)).
In particular, any consistent and conversely consistent correspondence p  is 
expressed as in above xohere p  — p\'2 .
Proof Let p  be any correspondence defined for two-person problems. Let the 
correspondence p  be defined as in above for problems involving more than 
one person and W.L.O.G. let p  select the unique allocation in one-person 
problems. Since p  — p\'2 , P is conversely consistent by definition. To see that 
p  is consistent, let £ = (N, H,iRi)ieN), $ jb N' C N  and p € p{£). Assume 
VV.L.O.G. that |A^ '| > 2. Gonsider the reduced problem £' = (£) and the
allocation pM> for ■ For »■ny N" C N' with |A^ "| - 2, we ha.ve ^
•dll other words, if there exist two different consistent, and conversely consistent exten­
sions of they would only differ in their selections from one-person problems.
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¡IN" e = ip{r%n{S)) = <{> (■£■')), since
N" C N  with |A/^ "| =  2 and ¡x G Therefore, by definition of we have
/¿Af' € (^AT'( )^)) showing that y? is consistent.
To show uniqueness of ip up to one-person problems, let ip' be any other 
consistent and conversely consistent extension of 'ip. Consistency of ip' re­
quires that ip' C ip. Similarly, converse consistency of ip' requires that 
ip C ip' in problems involving more than one person, showing the uniqueness 
of the extension up to one-person problems.
Any consistent and conversely consistent correspondence ip is in particular 
a consistent and conversely consistent extension of ip\2- By uniqueness of 
the consistent and conversely consistent extension of ip\2 up to one-person 
problems, ip is expressed as in above where ip = p\2- 
QED
For any correspondence Tp defined for two-person problems, let Ext (ip) be 
the consistent and conversely consistent extension of Tp selecting the unique 
allocation in one-person problems. The correspondence Ext (ip) is uniquely 
defined by Lemma 2. For any two correspondences ip and ip' defined for 
two-person problems such that ip C we have Ext (ip) C Ext {ip'). In 
])articular, if {ipa}aei collection of correspondences defined for two-
[lerson problems, we have:
\ jE x t{ ip ,J  C Ext  i [jip^
cxEl \cj(£l
''The proof of the uniqueness part makes implicit use of the “Elevator Lemma” in 
Thomson (1998). The Elevator Lemma states that if p\i  C ip'\2·, P ii> consistent and p' is 
conversely consistent, then C up to one-person problems.
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Moreover, for any linear order ^  on M  and any M. C M^ we have: 
by Proposition 1 and Lemma 2.
Let {'^a,b}b)eHxn indexed family of relations on Af. The fam­
ily {^a,6}(„ ¡,)6Hx7i' -acyclic  if there do not exist distinct elements
i|,Z2, · · ■ ,^n e AT and a i ,a 2, . . .  ,ctn € H  with n > 3 such that ii ^,,i,a2
(^1.2,<1-3 · ■ ■ tla„-i,an ^a„,ai *1·
For any correspondence Tp defined for two-person problems, we can nat­
urally induce a family of relations {^a,b}^ab)enxH follows. For any
a, b G W, if a — let ha,6= 0, otherwise if a ^  b, let ha ,6 be the rejltxive 
relation such that for any distinct i , j  G Af, we ha.ve i ha ,6 j  if and oidy it p  
chooses the underlined allocation from the following problem:
If
a a
b b
L em m a 3 i f  a Pareto optimal and conversely consistent correspondence p  
is such that p \2 is non-empty valued, then p[i induces a 3 '^  - -acyclic jarnily of 
relations on Af ■ Conversely, for any consistent correspondence p such that 
p \-2 induces a 3 "^ -acyclic family of relations on Af and is Pareto optimal, the 
correspondence p is Pareto optimal.
Proof: Let p  be any Pareto optimal and conversely consistent correspon- 
deiKXi such that p[i is non-empty valued. Let {ha,b}(^a,b)enxH 
ily of relations induced by p \2 on Af. Suppose that there exist distinct 
elements i \ , i 2,---Pn  G f f  and a i ,a 2, . . . ,a n  6 H  with n > 3 such that
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¿1 hai,a2 *2 · · · ^a„_i,a„ İn han,a, H- Consider the following problem S
and the underlined allocation fi:
Rn Ro Ri.
«n ai 02 ^n— 1
Ti 02 Ö3
Note that for any two distinct integers l ,k  € {1,2, we have that
/'-{vvA:} € <p\2 (^{¿„¿^}(^)) = ^  ’^ y converse consistency
of <p, we have y, G a, contradiction to (f being Pareto optimal and /i being
Pareto dominated in S. Therefore, the family {^ «.,6 }(a,6)€HxH
For the converse, let ip be any consistent correspondence such that p \2 
induces a -acyclic family of relations {ha,b} o n  Af and is Pareto 
optimal. Suppose that p  is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists £ =  
(N ,f I , iR iU N )  and p, E p(£) such that p is weakly Pareto dominated by 
anotlier allocation p' for £. We will show that there exists a cycle of agents 
= io €: N  such that each one envies the next, under p. Let 
t/i ^  N' C N  be the set of agents who are strictly better off under p'. Since 
preferences are antisymmetric and the agents in N \N '  are indifterent between 
p and //, their assignments are the same in either case, i.e. p '\n \N’ =  p \n \N'· 
Therefore, we have that p'{N') = p{N'). Now, consider the bijection tt = 
/ i - ‘ o p' ■. N  ^  N. Since p '\n \n ' = iAn \n ' and p'{N') = M.R'), we have 
that 's Ihe identity map on N \  N' and 7t|;v' is u. permutation of
N'. Choose i E N' and let Ni — |  •7r^(i) | A: G (0 ,1 ,2 ,.. C N'.'' Let
’'Here, TT*·' denotes the map w composed k times witli itself and tt * — (tt ') . The 
triap tt'* denotes the identity.
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j  G Ni- Since //(7r(j)) = fi 0 (//“' o //) (j) — n'ij) and j  € N.', we have 
that = n'{j) Pj i.e. j  envies 7r(y) under fi. In particular,
j  ^  '^(i) i , 7t(j ) G M·, therefore, n = |A^ j| > 2. Note that for any 
j  =  TT^ ii) € find any positive integer k sucli that 7t^ (j ) = j ,  we have
TT^Hi)  =  7T  ^ O 7T 0 7r^ {i) 7T  ^ O 7T‘=(j) 7T -/ ( i ) 7T  ^ O 7T (^•¿) = i. Then,
= I?;, Tr(^ ), 7r'^(z),. . . ,  7r^“ *(z)|, so k > |A^ i| = n. Therefore, the agents 
vi, 7r(i), 7r"*(z),. . . ,  7t”“ '( i) are all distinct, for otherwise there exists j  G Ni 
a.nd a positive integer k < n such that 7t^ (j ) = j ,  a. contradiction. Then, 
we have Ni = {z,7r(i),7r‘'^(i),. . .  , 7r"“ ‘(;i)}. Moreover, since 7r”(i) G Ni, by 
a similar argument, we can only have tluit 7r”(ii) = i. Letting ik = 7r^ ’('i) 
a.nd ilk = fi{ik), we have that Uq = ■ ■ ■ a2Pi,aiPi^ao. Moreover,
for any k G {0 ,1 ,... ,n  -  1}, we have aA:+i a^, for otherwise there exists 
k G { 0 ,1 ,..., n -  1} such that But then, by cov..si‘it<incy of
ip, the following underlined allocation is chosen by p  and hence by p\2, from
the reduced problem
(Ik
(ik+l
a. contradiction to p \-2 being Pareto optimal. In particular, we have n > 3, 
for otherwise, if n =  2, then Oo = a2T;,ai, a contradiction to a / ^ + i a / ;  
foi' k =  0. Moreover, for every A: G {0, 1, . . .  ,n  — 1}, the reduced problem 
v'r x(£) is of the form:
d k + l
g ± Clk
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where the underlined allocation is chosen by by consistency of But 
then, ¿0 hao,a,,-i *n-i ··· ^«.2,a, H ^a,,ao *0 and H > 3, a Contra­
diction to {'^a,b}(^ab)e'Hx'H -acyclic. Therefore, ip is Pareto op
(•ornpleting the proof of the lemma.
A restatement of Lemma 3 gives us the following characterization of 
Pareto optimal., consistent, and conversely consistent correspondences.
Corollary 2 A correspondence p is non-empty valued in one and two-person 
problems, Pareto optimal, consistent, and conversely consistent if and only if 
p  = E xt {ip) for some non-empty valued and Pareto optimal correspondence 
p dejined for two-person problems that induces a - a c y c l i c  family of relations 
on I f .
A relation ^  on I f  is -acyclic  if there do not exist distinct elements 
i \, ¿2,. . . ,  in G with n > 3 such that i\ ^  i '2 b  · · · ^  in ^  ii· Any complete 
and -acyclic relation is transitive. A transitive relation is -acyclic if and 
only if its indifference cbisses are of size smaller than 3. For any complete and 
-acyclic relation ^  on Af, let p -  be the non-empty valued, Pareto optimal 
and neutral correspondence defined for two-person problems, such that for 
any two distinct agents i, j  6 I f  and a.ny problem S of type:
p . P.r
a a
b b
the set p-{S)  contains the underlined allocation if and only if i P j- In this 
case, the family of relations {'tia,b}b)e'Hxn 'reduced by p -  are such that for 
any distinct a ,b ^ 'H ,  we have ^«,6= ^ .
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By the a.xiom of choice, for any reflexive, complete, and -acyclic relation 
^  on J\f, there exists a linear order If ^  has n indifference chusses
of size 2, then there exist exactly 2" such linear orders. For example, when 
= {'¿15*2,*3,*4,*5, *e} with |2V"| = 6, a typical reflexive, complete and d"··- 
acyclic relation ^  on M  is depicted as follows:
)-
«3 *6 
*2
i\ ir,
¡4
Since ^  has two indifference classes of size 2, there are exactly 4 linear orders 
^ 2, ^ 3, ^4 C t:, obtained by arbitrarily breaking indifferences:
t 2 h-s ^4
is i(>
ie ie is is
i '2 ¿2 i'2 i'2
i\ ir, i\
h ii if:> i[
'¿4 %4 l4 i-i
We also have that (p- = ¡2 U ¡2 U I2 U p-'' I2·
L em m a 4 A correspondence (p is non-empty valued, Par'eto optimal, consis­
tent, conversely consistent, and neutral if and only ij there exists a rellexivc, 
complete, and -acyclic relation ^  on Af such that ¡p =  Ext ■
Proof: Let ^  be a reflexive, complete, and Z'^-acyclic relation on J f . Let 
tp = Ext (fp-^· By the axiom of choice, there exists a linear oi'der y 'C h -
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Then, v -^^1'2 C i.e. =  Ext  C Ext Since ip contains
the simple serial dictatorship ip-\ it is non-empty valued. The correspondence 
(f is consistent and conversely consistent. By Lemma 3, it is also Pareto 
optimal. To see that ¡p is neutral, let 0 C Af, S — {N, H cind
S' = (N, H ', W.L.O.C., assume that |A^ | > 2. Suppose that there
exists a bijection it : II IP satisfying:
\/i G N, Va, h e l l  : allib Tt{a)R!-'K{b),
Let /i G p{S). By definition of p, we have:
VA^ ' C N  with \N'\ = 2 : UN' e p^ {r%,{S)) .
Take any N' C N  with \N'\ — 2. From above, pN' G {'''n '(^))· Note 
that 7t|,j(/v') : /^ ( A^ ') tt o p{N') is a bijection between the liouse sets of the 
reduced problems and rJ^P{S') satisfying:
V'i G N ', V(i, b G ) : dIii\ii(N')^ |7ro/i.(N') \^i-i{N')i,b'j,
So, by neutrality of p -  for two-person problems, (tt o p) |/v' =  7r|;i(/v') ° ^
p -  (r'^/'iS')). Since this is true for any such N', by definition of p, we have 
that TT o p e p(S'). Therefore, p is neutral.
For the converse, let p  be a non-empty valued, Pareto optimal, con­
sistent, conversely consistent, and neutral correspondence. By Lemma 2, 
p  = Ext [p\2) up to one player problems, and by Lemma 3, p[i induc(!s a
2 '^  acyclic family of relations h)eny.n on Af. Note that in this case.
since p  is non-empty valued, the equality p = Ext {p\2) also holds lor one- 
|)erson problems and for a.ny pair of distinct a,b e H, the relation „^,6 i« 
complete. Since p  is neutral, in particular, p \2 is neutral. Neutrality ot p \2
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i*equires in turn that the reflexive and complete relation «^.,6 is identical for 
any pair of distinct a^b ^ H. Let tl = ha,b foi' some—or for any pair of dis­
tinct a, b G T~i. Then, ( [^2 = Tp-. Moreover, since the family is
-acyclic^ the relation ^  is 3'  ^- acyclic. Therefore, p = Ext  (^-)> where ^  
is a reflexive., complete^ and 3^ -acyclic relation on A/^ , completing the proof 
of the lemma.
CiED
The following theorem states that a correspondence is non-empty valued., 
Pareto optimal., consistent., conversely consistent., and neutral if and oidj  ^ if 
it can be expressed as a union of simple serial dictatorships in a particular
manner.
T heorem  2 A coimespondence ip is non-empty valued  ^ Pareto optimal, con­
sistent, conversely consistent, and neutral if and only if there exists a reflex­
ive, complete, and 3'  ^-acyclic relation ^  on Af such that:
ael
■where is the set of Imear ordwrs contained in
P ro o f Let ^  be any reflexive, conrplete, arid acyclic relation on Af and 
bd: be the set of linear orders contained in We will show that
Ext{<p^) = U v ·- '.
Tins will prove the theorem, by Lemma 4. We already know that
a£l \aEl ^
By showing that consistent and conversely consistent, we will
have that (‘onsistent and conversely consistent extension ot
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which will imply the desired equality, by Lemmci 2. By Proposition 2, 
simple serial dictatorships are consistent. Therefore, i·“^ consistent
as a union of consistent correspondences. To see tlmt conversely
consistent, let E — (N, H, (7?,)ig;v) with |A^ | > 2 and let ¡i be an allocation (or 
£, such that for any N' C N  with \N'\ = 2, we have € Uae/'P 
So, for any { i , j}  C N  with i ^  j ,  we can choose a{ij) € / such that 
G we call define a reflexive and complete
I’elation on N, sucli that for any distinct i , j  G N, we have i y '  j  if and
only if i i- Then, y '  is -acyclic, since Uae7 |/v) In -
Also note that y '  is transitive, since it is complete and -acyclic. Moreover, 
since each is antisymmetric, we have that y '  is antisymmetric, showing
that y '  is a linear order on N. Since \n  ^ there exists ft ^ ! such that
y '= y y  In · Moreover, since p, is the serial dictatorship allocation induced 
by y '  for E, for any N' C N  with \N'\ = 2, we have = (p-i’(r'l,f,{E)). 
But then, since is a. simple serial dicta.torship, it is conversely consistent, 
therefore we have {p} = ^-'^(E) C (^)> showing that
conversely consistent.
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Chapter 4
G eneralizations
In this chapter, we will release some of the so far standing axioms, with 
the hope of identifying more ‘egalitarian’ classes of consistent rules. VVe will 
iii'st present a weaker form of the pairwise neutrality axiom, namely Urwer 
neutrality and identify the class of weakly Pareto optimal, pairwise consistent 
and lower neutral rules in Theorem 3. Then, we will allow rules to associate 
with each problem a lottery over alloca.tions, instead of restricting ourselves 
to sure allocations and we will extend the consistency principle to lottery­
valued rules. Unexpectedly, the latter attempt will lead to a negative result, 
as we will show in Tlieorem 4 that there does not exist an ex-post Pareto 
optimal, consistent and ex-ante anonymous lottery-valued ride.
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4.1 W eakening N eu tra lity
VVe will now introduce a weaker form of pairwise neutrality ior rules, namely 
lower neutrality and characterize the class of weakly Pareto Optima,l  ^ pairwise 
consistent and lower neutral rules in Theorem 3. We will name these rides 
which generalize simple serial dictatorships as simple serial bidictatorships, 
as the reason will be clear shortly.
Lower neutrality requires that whenever in a two-person problem both 
agents rank some house a as their top choices, the agent who is assigned a 
should continue to receive it in any other two-person problem involving the 
same agents where they raid-c a as their top choices, irrespective of the other 
house involved in the problem. Formally, a rule is lower neutral  il for 
any two distinct agents i , j  6 J\i and any three distinct houses a,b,c G Pi, 
one has that:
Hii) = a <=> n'ii) = a,
where p =  p>{S), p' = problems £ and £' are as follows:
£ £ '
Pi Pi Pi
a a a a
b b c c
In other words, lower/neutrality requires tliat whenever two agents compete 
for the possession of a. certain house, the decision to favor one agent over the 
other may only depend on the labeling of their most preferred house.
Now, let a problem £ = {N, H, and a complete preorder ^  on N
with the size of indifference classes being no larger than 2 be given. Denote
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the partition of N  into the indifference classes induced by ^  by lnd{N ,y).  
Also, let a vector of tie-breaking functions t = (ti)i^ind{N >) with tf. H —> /, 
for every /  € Jnd(N ,y)  be given. Let rn = \Ind(N ,y)\ < |A/^ | a.nd for each 
positive integer r < rn, let F  be the indifference class from the top in N  
w.r.t. The serial bidictatorship allocation induced by fo and t f o r  
£ is defined inductively as follows. First, if |/*| = 1, let F  = {i} and give 
agent i his most preferred house in H. Otherwise, if |/^| =  2, let /* =
If the top-ranked houses of i and j  in H arc the same, say a, then give a 
to tii[a) and give the other agent his second best house. Otherwise, if the 
top-ranked houses of i and j  are different, then give i and j  their top-ranked 
houses in H. At the step, if | / ’'| = 1, let P' =  {i} and give agent i his 
most preferred house among those that are not already allocated in earlier 
steps. Otherwise, if | / ’ | = 2, let F  = If the top-ranked houses of i and
j  among those that are not already allocated in earlier steps are the same, 
say a, then give a to 0 ’ («) and give the other agent his second best house 
a.rnong those that are not already allocated in earlier steps. Othei wise, if the 
top-ranked houses of i and j  among those that are not already allocated in 
(!a.rlier steps are different, then give i and j  their top-ranked houses among 
those that are not already allocated in earlier stepsL
'(jibbarcl (1973) and Sattert.hwaite (1975) show that for social choice functions with un­
restricted preference domain and cardinality of range greater than two, stralcgy-proofness 
is eciinvalent to dictatorship. However, note that serial bidictatorships are strategy-proof 
but not necessarily dictatorial, showing that strategy-proofness does not imply dictatorship 
in the context of house allocation problems. Serial bidictatorships constitute a subclass 
of “hierarchical exchange functions”, introduced in Papai (1997) and “top trading cycles 
mechanisms” , introduced in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1998b).
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E xam ple: Consider the problem £ = (N, and the relation ^  on
N  depicted below:
P4 P5 Pg
y
Px Pi Ps a e
a c b a d b
f d c h c d
h f f c f c
e e a c a f
d a d f e a
c h e d b e
3 6 
2
1 5
Note th a t rn =  \Ind(N ,y)\ = 4 with / '  =  {3,6}, P^  = (2 ), /'^ =  (1 ,5 ) and
/'* := {4}. Let the vector of tie-breaking functions t = (ti) lGlnd{N>) l)e sucli
f{3,6}(«) = ¿{3,6}(<^ ) = f{3,6}(e) = ¿{3,6}(/) = 3, 
f{3,6}(i') = ¿{3,6}(i^ ) =  6)
t{i,5}(b) =  l-{i,5}{d) =  f{i ,5}(e) --- f ,
VVe will now go through the algorithm described in the above [paragraph in 
order to find the serial bidictatorship allocafion induced by ^  and t for £. 
Step I: Since |/*| = |{3,6}| =  2 and the top-ranked houses of agents 3 and 
6 are both 6, we give b to 6 = t^ :i^ e]{b) and agent 3 receives his second best 
house in 77, namely c.
Step 2: Since \P\ = |{2)| = 1, we give agent 2 his top-ranked house among 
those that are not already allocated in earlier steps, namely d.
Step S: Since |/'^ = |{1,3)| =  2 and the top-ranked houses of agents I and 5 
among those that are not already allocated in earlier steps are different, we
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give both agents 1 and 5 tlieir best houses among those that are not already 
allocated in earlier steps. Namely, 1 receives a and 5 receives / .
Step .{■ Since |/''| = I {4) I = 1, we give agent 4 his top-ranked house among 
those that are not already allocated in earlier steps, namely e.
Then, the serial bidictatorship allocation induced by ^  and t Гог £ is the 
underlined allocation depicted below:
/А P2 Рз Рл Pb Pe
a c b a d b
./■ d c b c d
t> f f c L c
c a a c a f
d a d f e a
c b e d b e
VVe will now introduce natural extensions of serial bidictatorsliips to the 
varia.ble population case. Let y  be a cornplete preorder on / /  with the size of 
indifference classes being no larger than 2. Denote the partition oi' Af into the
indifference classes induced by ^  by Jnd{J\f,У). Let t = (ti) bee a
vector of tie-breaking functions with tp. 7i I  tor every 1 G Ind(Af, ^ ). For 
any problem £ = {N,JI,iRi)i^N), let t(£} = i:t{£)i)i^ind{N,y\N) vector
of tie-breaking functions with ¿(¿^)/: H —> /  for every I G Ind(N,y\i\f), 
such tha.t whenever |/ | = 2, we ha.ve that t{£)i - i/l/-/. A rule is the
simple serial bidictatorship induced by y  and t if for any problem 
£ — (N, it chooses the serial bidictatorship allocation induced
by arid t(£) for £. In this case, the rule is denoted by
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L em m a 5 Let £ — {N ^ he a problem, y  a complete preorder on
N with the size of mdijjerence classes being no larger than 2 and let t =
ieind{N >) vector of tie-breaking functions with /7 : H  ^  i for every
I G I n d ( N ,y ) , An allocation ¡.i for £ is the serial bidictatorship allocation 
induced by y  and t for £ if and only if the following are true:
./. For any i , j  G N with i >- j : p.(i)Rip,{j),
2. For any {i^j} G Ind{N, y )  with i 7^  j :
lx{j)P,li{i) and j  = (/^(i))·
Proof: Let S — (A^,//, (/¿¿)ieN) a· problem, b  a. complete preordcn· on 
N  with the size of indifference classes being no larger than 2 and let /; = 
di)ieind{N >) vector of tie-breaking functions with tj: H ! for every
/ e Ind{N ,y ) .  Let rn = |/nd(A^, fe)| < |Af| and for each positive integer 
/· < m, let be the indifference class from the top in N  w.r.t. fe.
First, assume that /i is the serial bidictatorship allocation induced by ^  
and t for E. Let z,j G N  with i >- j .  Then there exists positive integers 
Vi, Vj such that r; < r,· < m, i G / ’’ and j  G Then, at step r,·, i
will receive his house from the set II \  fi = p {[jfLr,
/'· = {i,k}. If the top-raidced houses of i and k in p (U/=,i distinct
or if the top-ranked liouse of i in p •'’i fhen p(i) is the
top-ranked house of i in p (Ut,·; k-h) ^ k El p· (U/=7i
so p{i)Rip(j). Otherwise, the top-raid<ed houses of i and k in p (U/=,·; 
the ScUTie, say a and a G tj,][k). Then, a = pik), so p{i) is the top-ranked
“lleie and after, we adhere to the convention that union over an empty collection of 
sets is empty.
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house in n (ur=r, w.r.t. B4 and /4j)  G /i (Ui=,.^  l ‘) C /i (Ui'^ ,·.
implying that Therefore, Condition 1. is satisfied.
Now, let {¿,i} € [nd(N^y)  with i 4  .?· Then, there exists a positive 
integer r such that P' = {i,j} · Then, a.t step r, agents i and j  will receive 
their houses from the set //, (UI=,· ■ Assume tha.t ¡i{j)Pin{i). Then, the top-
ra.rdied houses of i and j  in /i (Ur=r I’) tli0 Sfi.rnc, ^ cxncl (I G tjr (y)) 
for otherwise ¡j,{i) is the top-ranked house in ¡i (U”=r w.r.t Jp and since 
we would have ¡j,{i)Ri^{j)^ a contra.diction to /i,(j)Pin(i). 
I'hus, a = i4j), so j  = tir{a) = /{¿j) (/i(j)). Moreover, since //.(.;) = a is 
the I,op-ranked house in ¡x (U t7· w.r.t. Rj and /i(i) G /i (U/=,· we have 
that fi(j)Rjix(i). Therefore, Condition 2. is sa.tisfied.
Ifor the necessity pai't, assume that the allocation /.i for £ is such that 
Conditions 1. and 2. are sa.tisfied. Note tha.t by Condition 1., for any positive 
integer r < rn, for any i G P and for any h G /t wci have that
l4i)Pili·, so that the to|)-rariked house of i in // (U"=r in l44' )·
a positive integer with r < rri. If | / ’’| = 1, let P'' — {¿}. Then {/i(/)} = p{P ) 
is the top-ranked house of i  in fj, (^ U;=,· 1^ ’ I = 2, let P' = { i , j }  with
i 4  j .  Note that by Condition 2., it ca.n not be the case that both /i( j)/·*;//(?,) 
and i4 i)Pjl4 j ) ■) so there exists three possibilities:
• Case P ix{i)Pii4j) and ¡j.{j)Pjn{i).
• Cast 2: and ¡x(j)Pji4'i)·
• Case 2: /i(f)Ti//(j) and fi(i)Pjfx(j).
Since the top-ranked houses of i and j  in fi (U ”=,· are in f-4 P  ) =  { p ( ' > ) c A j ) } ■, 
we have that:
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• Case 1:
— The top-ranked-house of i in /i 's
— The top-ranked-house of j  in fi (^ U;=r
• Case 2:
— The top-ranked-house of i in (U/=r
— The top-raid<ed-house of j in fi ( ^ U " = r MJ)·
• Case 3:
— The top-ranked-house of i in (U/=r /^(0)
— The top-ranked-house of j  in /r (^ U/ILj· /^(0·
If tlie top-ranked houses of i and j  in /i (U;=,· a.re different, then Case
I. above prevails, so, both i and j  receive their top-ranked houses in /i (U!=r ^^ )·
If the top-ranked houses of % and j  in [i (U;=,· ai’e tlie same, sa.y a, then
cither Case 2. or Case ■]. will prevail. If i = C’ (a), then Case 2. will not
prevail, for otherwise a — /i{j), n{j)Pii-i(i) and j  /  i =
contradiction to Condition 2.. Therefore, if i = tir(a)^ then Case d. prevails, 
i.e., a = li(i), i.e., i receives his best house in ¡j, (U;=r i  receives his
best hoLi.se among the remaining houses {//(j)} U (Ufcr+i -^0)’
ond best house in ¡x (U”=,· l ‘)· Symmetrically, if j  = A/’ («) thfin j  receives his 
best house in /i ‘Wid i receives his second best house in //. (U/=r
So, initially, if P  = {«}, then agent i receives his most preferred house in
II. Otherwise, il P  = {i,i} with i ^  j ,  moreover if the top-raidced houses 
of i and j  are different, then i and j  receive their top-ranked houses in U . 
Otherwise, if the top-ravdved houses of i and j  in H  are the same, sa.y a, the
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agent t j i (a)  receives a and the other agent receives his second best house in 
/7. y\t the step, if then agent i receives his most preferred house
a.inong those that are not already allocated in earlier steps. Ol.herwise, if 
I' — {*)i} with i ^  j ,  moreover if the top-ranked houses of i and j  among 
those that are not already allocated in ea.rlier steps are different, then i a.nd 
j  receive their top-ranked houses among those that are not already allocated 
in earlier steps. If the top-ranked houses of i and j  among those that a.re not 
aJrecvdy allocated in earlier steps are the same, sa.y a, the agent tjr{a) receives 
a and the other agent receives his second best house among those that are 
not already allocated in earlier steps. Therefore, /i is the serial bidicta.torship 
allocation induced by ^  and t for £.
QED
P roposition  6 Simple serial bidictatorships are Pareto optimal, consistent, 
conversely consistent and loioer neutral.
Proof: Let ^  be a. complete preorder on M  with the size of indifference 
classes being no larger tlian 2 and t = vector of (,ie-breaking
functions with tp. H I for every I € lnd{Af,'^).
It is obvious that ip-’'' is lower neutral. To see that p - ’' is Pareto o'ptvmal, 
hit S = (N, H,{Ri)ieN) be a problem and p, = Note tha.t for each
/ 6 lnd(N,y\M)·, there exists // 6 /  with p(p)Rt,p{j), for any J ^ P Define 
tlie reflexive relation as follows. For any distinct i j  e N, let i y '  j
if and only if:
(?: j)  or (i ~  j  and i = /{¿J}).
'I'hen, is a linear order on N. Moreover, note that for a.ny t , j  G N  
with i y '  i ,  we have that n{i)Rip{j). Therefore, by Lemma i, p is the serial
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dicl,atorship allocation induced by for in particular ¡.i is Pardo optir 
Thus, is Pareto optimal.
To see that is consistent, let S = (N, iI,(Ri)i^i\f) be a problem, 
p, = p - ’'-{E), ^ ^  N' C N  and S' — r'l^,{S). Note that since p is the serial 
bidictatorship allocation induced by y\N and t{S) for S, we have that:
1. For any i , j  € N  with i l4i)
2. For any { i ,j}  € Ind{N, with i ^  j:
p{j)Pip{i) p{j)Rjp{i) and j  = (/i(j)),
by Lemma 5. Let i , j  E. N' with i y \N '.]■ Then, we have that i , j  € N  with 
i· so by Condition 1. above, p{i)Rip(j), i.e., PN'{i) Ri\,,{N')
Therefore, Condition 1. is satisfied for y  |ai', I^N' ^nd S '. Now, let
{i,j}  E Ind{N',y\N ')  with i 7^  J and pN'{j) Pi\dN‘) dN'i'i)· Then, we ha.ve 
that {i,j} G Ind{N,y\M ), i ^  j  and p{j) = pN'ij) Pi PN'(i) = lAi), so 
by Condition 2. above, we have that p{j)Rjp{i) and j  — /,(T){,j} (/i(i)), 
i-e., PN'(j) RjldN') PN'i'·) »’rid j  = l{i,j}il4j)) = H£'){i,j}ipN'U))· Thus, 
Condition 2. is satisfied for t{S'), ¡.ini a.nd S'. Therefore, by Lemma 5,
p,i\]i is the seria.1 bidictatorship allocation induced by ^|;v' and tiS') tor S', 
i.e., /¿AT' =  p - ’^ iS') = (/?-■'· (r^,(T)). So, p - ’' is consistent.
To see that (/?-’* is conversely consistent, let S = {N, f:[,{Ri)i^N) 1^ « a 
problem and p an allocation for S such that for any (¡) ^  N' C N  with 
|A^ '| = 2, we have that /r/v' = p - ’' {r'l^,{S)). Let i , j  E N  with i ^  j  and 
S' = r'{ip}(P)· First, let i y \N j ,  i.e., i y\{ij}.j. Then, since //.{¿,,·} is the 
seria,l bidictatorship allocation induced by arid t(S') lor S', we liave
that P{i,j}ii) Ri\ip{ij}) by Lemma 5. So, p{i)Rip{j), hence. Con­
dition I. in Lemma 5 is satisfied for ^ I a^ j l{P)i d and S. Now, let i ~ a/ J
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and ii{j)Pin{i), i.e., {i,j}  G /nd({i,i} , and
Then, since is the serial bidictatorship allocation induced by |^{¿,/}
t(£') For £', we have that, li{ij}(j) Rj\^ ,{{i,:¡}) aridj = ^
l)y Lemma 5. So, ii{j)Rjn{i) and j  = ¿(¿’){; ,·} (/i(j)), hence, Condition 2. in 
Lemma 5 is satisfied Ibr P\n ·, l-i£)i /< £■ Therefore, is conversely
consistent, completing the proof of the proposition.
QLD
T heorem  3 If a rule is weakly Pareto optimal, pairwise consistent, and 
lower neutral, then it is a simple serial bidictatorship.
Proof: Let (p be a. weakly Pareto optimal, pairwise consistent, and lower 
neutral rule. Let a £ 7i. Define the reflexive and complete relation on 
J\f a.s follows. For any two distinct agents i , j  G Af, let i j  if there exists 
a house G \  {a} such that p chooses the underlined allocation from the 
following problem:
P i P:i
a a
b b
Note that by loiver neutrality of p, we have i j  if and only il tor any 
c €: PC \  {a}, the rule p  chooses the underlined allocation from the following 
|)roblem:
Pг p^
a a
c Ç
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Therefore, the relation is antisymmetric. Let A· G M  be such that 
i' '^ a. j  ai'icl j  ^a. k. If the agents i, j  and k are not distinct, then we 
immediately have that i k. Otherwise, if the agents i, j  and k ai e distinct, 
then let b,c ^ 7 i  \  [a] with h ^  c and consider the following problem £■.
Pi P.l Pk
a a a
b b b
c c c
Let /r =: Note that n{k) 7^  a, for otherwise we obtain a contradiction
to j  ^a k and pairxoise consistency of ip, by considering the reduced problem 
i^}{£). Similarly, /r(j) /  a, for otherwise we obtain a contradiction to i ^a 
j  and parnoise consistency oi cp, by considering the reduced problem 7·^  ^^(T). 
Therefore, p,{i) = a. But then, we have that the underlined allocation iJ.{i,k} 
is selected by ip from the reduced problem
Pk\i4{i,k})
a a
H{k) l.i{k)
since ip is pairxuisc consistent. So, i ^a k, i.e., ^a is transitive. Therefore, ^a 
is a linear order, for any a G Ti·.
Let a, 6 G Tf and i , j ,  k G Ai be distinct. Suppose that k is bottom-ranked 
in { i , j ,k }  w.r.t. fil'd top-ranked in { i ,j ,k }  w.r.t. Let c £l 'H \  {a,b}. 
W.L.O.G., let i ^a j  f>"d consider the following problem £:
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p . P.i Pk
c a a
a c c
h h h
Ijct ¡1 — (^{S). Note that a ^  /i(A;), for otherwise we obtain a coiitradiction 
i  pairiDist consistency of (/p, by considering the reduced problem
/ }(^)· ►^ d^d^ ose that a = /i(i), then /¿(z) = c, for otherwise ¡i{i) = b and we 
obtain a contradiction to i j  and painuise consistency oi yp, by considering 
the reduced problem r|· But then /.¿(z) = c and ^(j) = a, so /i(A:) = h
contradicting k i ¿^ nd pairwise consistency of yp, in the reduccxl problem 
r^. The ordy remaining possibility is that a = /^(0? this contradicts
pairwise consistency and lueak Pareto optimality of yp, since the agents z and 
/z“ ‘(c) can become strictly better off by exchanging their assigned houses 
in ?·/· _w.u(^)· Therefore, for any distinct aj)  G H  and z, j, A; G Ai^ k can 
not, be both bottom-ranked in {i,j-,k} w.r.t. and top-ranked in { i ,j ,k }  
w.r.t. ^ 1).
,Sui)|)ose that there exists houses a, 6, c ^ 7i and distinct agents i, j, k ^ M  
witli i j  ^6 k i. Note that it can not be the case that a = b — c, lor 
otiierwise we obtain a contradiction to the antisymmetry and transitivity ol 
'Ca=hb=hc· Then, either |{a ,6, <^}| -  2 or |{a, 6, c}| - 3. II |{a ,6, c}| =  2, 
VV.h.O.C. let a = b ^  c. Then, i j  ha k, i.e., k is bottom-ranked in 
{ i , j ,k }  w.r.t. ha, therefore k can not be top-ranked in { i , j ,k }  w.r.t. ^,,, by 
tlie previous paragraph, so we must have that j  he k. But then j he k he i 
and i ha j  ha k, i.e., i is bottom-ranked in { i ,j ,k }  w.r.t. he and top- 
ranked in {i,j, k} w.r.t. ha, a contradiction to the previous paragraph. Thus,
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I {a, 1), c} \ ^  2, so the only remaining possibility is that |{a, 6, c} \ = 3, i.e., the 
houses a, b, c are distinct. But then, since for a,ny agent / G {i,j,k}:
h G {a, 6, c} 
h G {ii, />, c}
/ is top-ranked in 
{z,i, A:) w.r.t.
/ is bottorn-rajiked 
in {¿,j,/i;} w.r.t.
< 2 and
< 2
we ha.ve that:
I· £ {'b.7>
/ G
3/r G {a, b, c] : 
3/i G {a, 6, c) :
> 2 and
> 2
/ is top-ranked 
in {i, i, k) w.r.t.
I is bottom-ranked 
in { i j , k }  w.r.t. yh ^
3'herefore, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists an agent / G {'/■, J, k] such 
tlmt / is top-ranked in w.r.t. У|  ^ for some h G {a,6, c) and bottom-
ranked in { i , j ,k }  w.r.t. for some h' G {a, 6, c}, contradicting the above 
|)aragraph. Thus, there do not exist houses a,b,c G Ti and distinct agents 
k G A/” with i y,i. j  hb k foe i-
bet fo= UtieW —a- Note that the relation fo on J\f is reflexive and compleLe. 
bet ¿,j, A: G M  be sucli that i fo j  and j  fo k. Then, there exists aj> G 'H 
with i fo„ j  and j  fo(, k. If agents i, j  and k are not distinct, we immediately 
have that i fo k. Otherwise, if agents i, j  and k are distinct, tlien let c G 'H- 
Note tliat it can not be the case that k fo^  i, for otherwise we hav(; tliat 
'/■ ha j  hb k he I i-i'iid i yj fk G Ai are distinct, a contradiction. But then, 
by completeness of fo,,, we must have that i fo^  k, i.e., i fo k. Thus, fo is 
transitive. Therefore, fo is complete preorder on M . Moreover, since there 
do not exist houses a,b,c G 'H a.nd distinct agents i , j , k  G Af with i fo„ j  hb
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k: h we have that the size of indifference classes of ^  are no larger than 2.
Define the vector of tie-breaking functions t = {ti)¡^ind{N' >) with tf. 7i ^  I  
for every I  G Ind{Af,y),  as follows. For any I = { i,j}  € Jnd{J\i,'^) and 
a G 7i, set ¿/(a) -- i if a.nd only if i j ■
Finally, let £ =■ {N, II, {Ri)i^]\r) be a problem and set n = ifi£)· Let i, j  6 
N  with i y \u  j ,  in particular i ^  j  and it is not the case that j  ^  i. So, for any 
a G 'H., we have that i j . Suppose that iJ,(j)Pin(i), then we must have that 
for otherwise we obtain a contradiction to pairwise consistency 
and weak Pareto optimality oi ip by considering the reduced problem r'if 
By pairwise consistency of p, the following underlined allocation is chosen
by p  from the reduced problem -ii£y·
A(i)
Hii) ll{i)
a contradiction to i j- Therefore, i-i{i)Riy{j), hence Condition f. in
Lemma 5 is satisfied. Now, let { i ,j}  G Ind(N,P\N) with i ^  j ,  then {i,;)} G 
Ind(A i,y) ·  Assume that n{j)PiiJ,{i), then we must have that, n[j)Pjii{t), tor 
otherwise we obta.in a contradiction to pairwise consistency and weak Pareto 
optimality of p  by considering the reduced problem Moreovei', by
pairwise consistency of p, the following underlined allocation is c.liosen by p  
from the reduced problem
MJ) MJ)
H{i) p{i)
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i  i  ~  ^{i,i}(/^(i))· '*^ 5^ Condition 2. in Lemma. 5 is a.lso
satisfied. Therefore, /i is the serial bidictatorship allocation induced by ^\j\i 
a.nd t{£) for E. Therefore, ip is the simple serial bidictatorship indncoxl by ^  
and t.
QED
53
4.2 L ottery-va lu ed  R ules
Witli the hope of overcoming the dictatorial feature of Pareto optirnal and 
consistent correspondemxis that we have confronted in our previous results, 
we will now allow rules to associate with each problem, a lottery over the 
allocations for that problem. In the following subsection, we will present 
the natural extension of the consistency principle to lottery-valued ludes. In 
the second subsection, we will present our main impossibility result stating 
that there does not exist an ex-post Pareto optimal^ consistent and ex-ante 
anonymous lottery-valued rule.
4.2.1 Consistency for Lottery-valued Rules
Given a problem £, let, A{S) denote the set of allocations for E. I'hen, a 
lottery  over A(£)  is a probability distribution p: A  [0,1] over A{E) 
(X//.e>l(f) 7j(/^) = Given a problem £ and a lottery p over A{£),  let the 
support o f  p be Supp{p) =  {¡i G A{£) \ pin) > 0}.
A lottery-valued rule <p is a ma.p that associates with each |)roblern a. 
lottery over the set of allocations for that problem.
The problem of extending the consistency [)rincipleto lottery-valued rides 
is not straightforward. In the context of lottery-valued rules, a non-degenerate 
solution associates positive probability to at least two difterent a.llocations 
for some problem. In this case, it is not clea.r wha.t is meant by a suliset ol 
agerd;s receiving their allocations before the others, since a priori, the agents 
do not face particular allocations but lotteries over them. It is thereloi'e not 
immediate how to obtain a reduced problem. Even when the subscd, ol agents 
w.r.t. whom the problem will be reduced is determined, there may be more
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tlian one reduced problem, each associated with a different allocation in the 
support of the lottery. I:iven if we somehow reduce the problem w.r.t. one of 
the allocations in the su])])ort of the lottery, it is no more possible to guara.ntee 
the remaining agents tlie lotteries that they were facing in the beginning, 
since some of the houses are no more available. Therefore, we will generalize 
consistency as follows: A priori, a. decision to draw the lottery in arbitrary 
sequence should not change the lotteries faced in the beginning. Iformally, a. 
lottery-valued rule ip is consistent  if for a.ny problem £ = (N, II, 
a.ny /i € Supp { p { £ ) )  a.nd any $ ^  N' C  N, we  ha.ve that:
« , ( £ ) ) :  p ' (V )=
where p = p(£) and p' = p(7’‘^ ,{£)).
A lottery-valued rule p is ex-post Pareto optimal  if for every prol)lern 
£, any a.llocation p, 6 Supp[p{£)) is Pareto optimal.
In the context of lottery-valued rules, it is clearly not possible to ‘equally 
l.reat the equals’ after a |)a.rticular allocation has been realized. Therefore, 
we ca.n oidy have anonymity before the lottery is drawn. Ex-ante anonymity 
recpiires tha.t a lottery-valued rule should be independent of the names of the 
agents. Formally, a lottery-valued rule p  is ex-ante anonymous  if loi' any 
0 7^  /■/ C H, any two problems £ = (A^,//, (/A)ieN), = (Af', II
and any allocation p for £, ifir: N -^ N' is a bijection satisfying:
Vi 6 N, Va, b £ H ■. aliib
then pip) — p'{p o 7T *), where p = y>{£) and p' = p{£')·
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4.2.2 The M a in  Im possibility
T heorem  4 There does not exist an ex-post Pareto optimal, consistent and 
ex-a/nte anonymous lottery-valued rtde.
Proof: Sup|)o.se tha.t <p> is an ex-post Pareto optimal, consistent and ex-ante 
a,nonymous lottery-valued rule, ddien, for any distinct i, j  G M  and a,b G PC, 
the rule ip will a.ssocia.te equal probability of |  to both allocations for the 
following problem:
Pг
a a
b b
since p  is ex-ante anonymous.
Let 1, 2, 3 be three distinct potentia.1 agents and a, b, c three distinct 
potentia.1 housfjs. Consider the following problem £:
Pi Pi Ps
a a a
b c c
c h h
and let p = t {^)· Note that there are exactly four Pareto optimal a.llocations 
/i', /P, ¡.P and for £ which are depicted below:
P^
Pi Pi Ps Pi Pi Pl Pi Pi Pi Pi Pi Pi
a a a a a a a a a a a a
b c c b c c b c c b c c
c b b c b b c b b c b b
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Suppose that /ti* G Sappip), i.e., p(p^) > 0. Consider the reduced problem 
''{i,2}(^) P' — ^  {'''{\,2}i^))· Let the allocation 17 for Le
follows:
as
Pi P2
a a
c c
By the ex-ante anonyrnity of we have that //(//) = 2}) “  2* More­
over, by consistency of c/p, we have that:
p'{v) =
E
which implies that p(/i|.jj,F) = p{p^) > 0, a contradiction to ex-post Pareto 
optimality of <p since the allocation (/i|3p*^) for £ is not Pareto optimal. 
Therefore, p' ^ Supp(p). By exchanging the roles of agents 2 and 3 and by 
using exactly symmetric arguments, we also have that fP ^ Supp(p).
Now, suppose that ¡P G Supp{p), i.e., pijP) > 0. Consider the reduced 
problem and let p' = . Consider the allocation V =
/‘{1,3} for
Pi P:i
a a
b h
By the ex-ante anonymity of (/p, we ha.ve that 'p'{y) = ^(/^{1,3}) = 2* More- 
ovei*, by consistency of (/p, we have that:
p{p\2)^ )^ _ P(/‘{2}»^) _  p(/‘')
E
( 'C ) O )
P(P{2}P^) p ( /r^ )+ P (/‘{2}>'·^ ) p{p^) +  pip')
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which implies that p(/i^) = > 0, a contradiction to /i^  ^ Supj){p)
wliich was established in the previous para-graph. Therefore, ^ Supp{p).
I^ y (exchanging the roles of agents 2 and 3 and by using exactly symmetric 
arguments, we also have that ^ Supp[p).
But then, by ex-post Pareto optimality of (^ , we have that:
Y , p(l^ ) = p{p^ ) + P{P'^ ) + p i/ )  + p / )  = 0,
ii.eA{£)
a. contradict,ion to p being a lottery over A{8). Therefore, thei'e does not 
exist an ex-post Pareto optimal, consistent and ex-ante anonymous lottery­
valued rule.
C^ ED
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Chapter 5
C oncluding remarks
This tliesis investigates the role of the consistency principle in house allo­
cation problems. Classes of allocation rules and correspondences satisfying 
(‘onsistency and its converse are identified. The class of rules satisfying weak 
forms of efficiency.  ^ consistency.^ and nendrality are characterized by serial dic­
ta,torships where eacli a.gent is assigned his best house, following a se(|uence 
determined by an exogenous priority ordering. The more general class of 
consistent and neutral rides turn out to be characterized by sexiuential so­
lutions generalizing serial dictatorships, where certain agents ix'ceive their 
least preferred house when their turn comes. The latter result is negative in 
i\\e sense that one can not recover otlier properties of interest l)y drop|)ing 
tlie effir.iency axiom. Another wa,y to generalize simple serial dicta,torships 
is by weakening neutrality to lower neutrality. Tlie class of Pareto optimal., 
consistent and Umer neutral rules are characterized by simple serial bidic­
tatorships where each a,gent is assigned his best house, following a, sequence 
determined by an exogenous priority ordering allowing ties of size two, which 
are in turn resolved by giving each agent a priority over the possession of cer-
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tain houses. The impossibilities concerning anonymity and equal treatment 
oi e(|uals remain present even in the case of rnultivahcd correspondences and 
loUery-valutd rules. A |)romising direction for further research and a way to 
recover some anonymity seems to be the identification of the geiifiral class of 
/ aveto optimal and consistent rules which do not necessarily satisfy a form 
of neutrality.
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A ppendix A
Independence of A xiom s
Let Af = {1,2,3} and = (a,/;, c) with \Af \ = \T~i\ = 3 in the following ex­
amples which establish tlie independence of axioms in Theorem 1, (Jorollary
1 and Theorem 3.
(i) Let (f select the serial dictatorship allocation induced by the order I >-
2 >- 3 in three-person problems, and the serial dictatorship allocation induced 
by the order 2 y '  1 y '  3 in all other problems. The rule ip is Pareto 
optimal and neutraL To see tha.t ip is not pavrvnse consistent^ consider the 
|)roblem £ depicted below:
Pi P2 Pi
— a a
h h b
c c c
Not(i that ip chooses the underlined allocation ¡i for £. Let ¡t' = ip ?
I,hen ///(1) = a = /i{i,2}(i), i.e., = / /  ^  /¿{1,2}· Therefore, (p
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(ii) Let, \ y  2 y  ‘i and consider the simple sequential solution By
Proposition 1, 9?-’® is neutral and consistent. To see that 95- ’® is not weakly 
Pareto optimal consider the following problem S:
is not; painuise consistent.
A ñ
a b
b a
where the underlined allocation is strongly Pareto dominated in £.
(iii) In any three-person problem £ = (N, let (f{£) be the core
from the endowment //; N  —> H , where 7/ ( 1) = a, ;/(2) = b and ;/('5) = c. In 
any two-person problem £ = {N, H  if H — //(A )^, then let <p{£) be
the core from the endowment //;v, otherwise if II ^  v{N)·, i-e·, N = {i , j},  
II =  {h,h'} with i/(i) = h and i/(j) ^  hf, then let ‘f (£)  be the core from the 
endowment V: N ^  / / , where u{i) = h and V{j) = /?/. The rule cp is Pareto 
optimal and consistent.' Consider the underlined selections of 9» from the 
following problems:
£ £'
P i P2 P[ P i
a a b b
b h a a
'Note that is Pareto optimal and non-empty valued and 9L does not induce a 3·*·- 
acyclic family of relations on AÍ. Therefore, by Lemma 3, (p is not conversely consistent.
62
Let /i =  ^{£) and ¡i' = Agent 1 is assigned a under /i. Therefore, if
is pairxuise neutral, agent 1 sfiould be assigned b under fi', hut this is not 
the case. Thus, (p is not pairioise neutral.
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